Swiss e-ID and agent mandates: status October 2026
The e-ID was meant to launch on 1 December 2026. On 30 June 2026 the federal government dropped that date. For agent mandates this changes less than it seems – and more than one might think.
Key points
- On 30 June 2026 the federal government dropped the e-ID launch of 1 December 2026.
- The trust infrastructure is targeted for the first half of 2027.
- The e-ID identifies principals, not agents; the mandate connects both.
Key points
- The e-ID proves who a person is, the mandate what their agent may do.
- Both use the same building blocks: SD-JWT VC, selective disclosure and OID4VP.
- The verifying party sees only the details it needs for the procedure.
- Binding profiles for agent mandates based on government identities do not exist yet.
The status
Swiss voters narrowly approved the e-ID Act in September 2025. In February 2026 the Federal Council named 1 December 2026 as the expected launch. On 30 June 2026 the federal government announced that the launch would be delayed: new developments in artificial intelligence, in particular deepfakes in the online issuance process, require additional security work. It did not name a new date for the e-ID.
The trust infrastructure on which the e-ID and other electronic credentials rely is to go live independently in the first half of 2027. The e-ID Act is to enter into force at least partially at that time.
What the e-ID does for agents – and what it doesn't
The e-ID identifies people. It thus answers the question of the principal, not of the agent and not of its authority. An agent does not receive an e-ID. What connects it to an identified person is a mandate – issued by a party that has verified the principal beforehand.
The irony of the postponement
The reason for the postponement is remarkable: AI-generated forgeries could lead to an e-ID being issued to an unauthorized person. The same technology that makes agents useful makes identifying people harder. That makes it all the more important that agent actions are attributed not only to an identity but to a verifiable mandate.
What operators can do until 2027
- Design mandates so the principal is named and the type of their identification can be carried as a claim.
- Use formats compatible with verifiable credentials, such as SD-JWT VC with key binding and status lists.
- Build in revocation from the start: a mandate without a status list is not fully verifiable.
- Produce receipts today so that a later change in the type of identification does not affect verifiability.
Assessment
The postponement removes time pressure from a possible connection to the state trust infrastructure, but does not change the basic question: anyone who lets agents act must be able to prove they are allowed to. That holds with and without an e-ID. This article will be updated as soon as the federal government names a new date.
How e-ID and mandate fit together technically
The Swiss e-ID and the EUDI wallet rely on the same building blocks as agent mandates: credentials in the SD-JWT VC format, selective disclosure and presentation through OID4VP. A mandate can therefore refer to an e-ID without inventing a new format.
The flow is simple: the principal identifies with their e-ID, the mandate service issues the mandate and binds it to this identity. For an action, the agent presents the mandate, and the verifying party sees that a government-identified person stands behind it.
Data protection through selective disclosure
Government identities contain many details: name, date of birth, nationality, photo. For an agent's action, the verifying party usually needs only a fraction of them, often just confirmation that an identified person stands behind it. Selective disclosure allows exactly that.
This matches the principle of data minimization required by the Swiss Data Protection Act and the GDPR. An agent thus does not carry its principal's entire identity, only the details its task requires.
What is still open
There are no binding profiles yet for connecting government identities and agent mandates. Open questions include which details a verifying party may request, how long a binding to the identity should apply and how revoking a mandate interacts with the status of the identity.
KYA already verifies mandates in the SD-JWT VC format today. A dedicated profile for the e-ID as proof of the principal's origin is planned once the federal infrastructure is in production.
A process from public administration
A person instructs her agent to request a deadline extension from an authority. She identifies once with her e-ID, and the mandate service issues a mandate for exactly this procedure. The agent submits the request with the mandate; the authority sees only name and date of birth.
Frequently asked questions
Can I give my AI agent my e-ID?
You should not. The e-ID proves your identity and stays in your wallet. Your agent receives a mandate instead, bound to your identity and containing only the details needed.
Which details from the e-ID does a verifying party see?
Only those disclosed in the presentation. With selective disclosure, this can be limited to a few details or to confirmation of an identification.
Does this also work with the EUDI wallet?
Technically yes, because the EUDI wallet uses the same building blocks, including SD-JWT VC and OID4VP. There are no binding profiles for agent mandates yet, however.
When will KYA verify the e-ID as proof of origin?
A dedicated profile is planned once the federal infrastructure is in production. KYA already verifies mandates in the SD-JWT VC format today.
Sources
- Der Bundesrat, Medienmitteilung vom 30.06.2026: Neuer Zeitplan für die Einführung der E-ID und der Vertrauensinfrastruktur: https://www.admin.ch/de/newnsb/4ZNYpSk3J1-U
- Stadt Bern, e-ID: Einführung verzögert sich: https://www.bern.ch/themen/stadt-recht-und-politik/digitale-entwicklung/digitalisierung-konkret/e-id-einfuehrung-verzoegert-sich
- Netzwoche, 25.02.2026: Bundesrat justiert bei der E-ID nach: https://www.netzwoche.ch/news/2026-02-25/bundesrat-justiert-bei-der-e-id-nach